

Monitoring of arms treaty? No sweat, ex-CIA official says

By RICHARD EGAN
News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Despite loss of electronic monitoring stations in Iran, the United States could adequately verify Soviet compliance with provisions of a proposed U.S.-Soviet arms limitation agreement, a former Central Intelligence Agency official says.

Even loss of U.S. monitoring stations in Turkey would not impede verification of a new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement said Herbert Scoville Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA.

He said SALT verification can be accomplished through satellite observations, radar, radio receivers, infrared sensors and other intelligence-gathering techniques.

SCOVILLE SERVED as CIA deputy director for research and as an assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which handles the SALT negotiations.

He now is vice-president of the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based, nonpartisan organization supporting arms limitation.

Some critics of the SALT II agreements assert that the loss of the Iranian bases will cripple U.S. efforts to ensure that the Soviets abide by the agreements. Twice within the last two months President Carter has said the United States can monitor the agreements despite loss of the Iranian bases.

Armed Iranian groups have taken control of two of the three U.S. monitoring stations in Iran. The third is believed to be in the hands of the Iranian air force.

U.S. officials are concerned about the future of the stations in Turkey because of growing political and economic problems in that nation.

AT A PRESS briefing, Scoville said the loss of the Iranian stations would deprive the United States of some telemetry from Soviet missile tests. Telemetry is information

"More detailed telemetry information on the characteristics of a missile being tested would be useful, though not essential," he said.

The stations in Turkey can pick up some telemetry from the Soviet missile-launching sites, he said.

But Scoville said acquisition of telemetry is not critical to verification of the arms agreements. He cited several key SALT II provisions he said could be adequately verified by other intelligence-gathering means:

- The over-all ceiling on the number of bombers and land-based and submarine-borne missiles the Soviets can deploy. Such strategic delivery vehicles "would be verified almost entirely by satellite observations," he said.

- Limitations on the number of missiles that can carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), or multiple warheads. He said any missile armed with MIRVs would have to be tested "to assure operational effectiveness."

He said U.S. monitoring equipment at stations in the Aleutians and aboard planes and ships can keep track of the number of warheads tested by monitoring Soviet landing zones in the Pacific Ocean and on the Kamchatka Peninsula across the Bering Sea from Alaska.

- Limitations on the number of warheads missiles can carry. "Compliance with this restriction can be monitored by watching the re-entry of a test missile and counting the number of MIRVs that return to earth," he said.

- Prohibition on the testing and deployment of more than one new type of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile.

Scoville said any significant changes in Soviet missiles that would be considered a new type under the SALT terms "would require a whole series of tests." Such tests, he said, would afford U.S. intelligence-

P. Egan, Richard
C. H. Scoville
Harvard
OR 91 SALT